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Abstract
Prisoner’s dilemma has been heavily studied. In classical model, each player
chooses to either ”Cooperate” or ”Defect”. In this paper, we generalize
the prisoner’s dilemma with a new alternative which is neither defect or
cooperation. The classical model is the special case under the condition that
the third state is not taken into consideration.
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1. Introduction
Game theory is exploited by von Neumann and Morgenstern [1] and de-
veloped by many researchers, such as Nash [2] and Shapley [3]. This theory is
extensively used in many fields, especially economics [4, 5] and biology [6, 7].
The current study is mainly focus on how to promote the cooperation in a
game [8, 9]. Game theory provides a mathematical framework to explain and
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address the interactive decision situations where the aims, goals and prefer-
ences of the participating agents are potentially in conflict [10, 11, 12]. A
strategic game contains three parts: set of players, set of strategies for each
player and payoff for each strategy combination, respectively. A solution to
a game is a certain combination of strategies. This solution which is self
enforcing and no player can gain by unilaterally deviating from it, is said to
be a Nash equilibrium [2].
Two-person non-constant sum game is a kind of widely addressed game,
such as iterated prisoner’s dilemma game. In this game, player 1 has a finite
strategy set S1 including p strategies. Player 2 has a finite strategy set S2
including q strategies. The payoffs of player 1 and player 2 are determined by
functions u1(s1, s2) and u2(s1, s2), respectively, where s1 ∈ S1 and s2 ∈ S2.
A combination of each players’ strategy (s∗1, s
∗
2) is a Nash equilibrium of this
two-person non-constant sum game if
u1(s
∗
1, s
∗
2) ≥ u1(s1, s
∗
2) ∀s1 ∈ S1 (1)
u2(s
∗
1, s
∗
2) ≥ u2(s
∗
1, s2) ∀s2 ∈ S2 (2)
2. Prisoner’s dilemma
This game, the “prisoner’s dilemma” [13], is a classic model of two-person
non-constant sum game. It described this situation. Two criminal suspects
are arrested and imprisoned. Each prisoner is in solitary confinement with
no means of speaking to or exchanging messages with the other. The police
admit they don’t have enough evidence to convict the pair on the principal
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charge. They plan to sentence both to a year in prison on a lesser charge.
Simultaneously, the police offer each prisoner a Faustian bargain. Each pris-
oner is given the opportunity either to betray the other or to cooperate with
the other. Here’s how it goes:
(i) If A and B both betray the other, each of them serves 4 years in prison;
(ii) If A betrays B but B cooperates with A, A will be set free and B will
serve 5 years in prison (and vice versa);
(iii) If A and B both betray the other, both of them will only serve 1 year
in prison (on the lesser charge).
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Figure 1: Prisoner’s dilemma
The game can be shown as Figure 1. Based on Eq.(1) and (2), its Nash
equilibrium is (D, D).
3. Proposed generalized prisoner’s dilemma
In the classical prisoner’s dilemma, each prisoner has two strategies,
namely cooperate (C) and defect (D). However, the prisoner may have
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another choice that is to silence (S). To be silence means that neither C nor
D has been chosen by the prisoners. If a prisoner’s strategy is S, it means his
attitude is ambiguous. Wave-particle duality is a well known theory that pro-
poses that all matter exhibits the properties of not only particles, which have
mass, but also waves, which transfer energy. Similar to this theory, the dual-
ity also exists in prisoner’s dilemma. In the classical prisoner’s dilemma, each
prisoner has two strategies, namely cooperate (C) and defect (D). However,
the prisoner may have another choice that is to silence (S). To be silence
means that neither C nor D has been chosen by the prisoners. If a prisoner’s
strategy is S, it means his attitude is ambiguous. Similar with the light which
has wave-particle dualism, strategy S implies the the prisoner can be either
C or D, but the police can not distinguish. In this case, S is a special state
which is a mixture of C and D. In this situation, the strategy set of each
prisoner is {C,D, S}. An example of this case is shown as Figure 2.
In the classical prisoner’s dilemma model, the third state S is not taken
into consideration. The proposed model is a generalization of classical pris-
oner’s dilemma which can be reduced to the classical prisoner’s dilemma
when the strategy S can be distinguished as C or D.
4. Conclusion
In this paper, a generalized prisoner’s dilemma model is proposed. Within
the proposed model, apart from “Cooperate” and “Defect”, the third state
“Silence” has been take into consideration. The classical model is the special
case of proposed generalized prisoner’s dilemma model under the condition
4
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Figure 2: generalized prisoner’s dilemma
that the third state is not taken into consideration.
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